Tax effort and oil royalties in the Brazilian municipalities  by Postali, Fernando Antonio Slaibe
Ad
t
e
p
e
h
J
K
©
r
R
n
n
p
d
d
p
n
P
©
r
h
1Available  online  at  www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
HOSTED BY
EconomiA 16 (2015) 395–405
Tax effort and oil royalties in the Brazilian municipalities
Fernando Antonio Slaibe Postali ∗
University of Sao Paulo, Department of Economics, Sao Paulo, SP 05508-010, Brazil
Received 20 February 2014; received in revised form 25 July 2015; accepted 25 August 2015
Available online 23 October 2015
bstract
This paper estimates a stochastic production frontier, to investigate whether municipalities covered by oil royalties in the last
ecade have reduced their tax effort in Brazil. The issue is relevant to the prospect of a substantial increase in these revenues and
he new rules for distribution of the funds, established by Law No. 12.734/2012. The inputs were provided by personnel and capital
xpenditures, whereas the product was defined as the municipal tax collection. With the purpose of overcoming the endogeneity
roblems due to reverse causality of output on inputs, we used the lagged independent variable as instruments in the inefficiency
quation. The data set is composed of a panel of Brazilian municipalities from 2002 to 2011. The results indicate that oil revenues
ave a negative impact on the estimated efficiencies, signaling reduced fiscal effort by the benefiting municipalities.
EL classiﬁcation: H21; H71; Q38
eywords: Oil windfalls; Stochastic frontier analysis; Tax effort; Municipalities; Endogeneity
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
esumo
Este artigo estima uma fronteira estocástica de produc¸ão a fim de investigar se os municípios beneficiados com royalties do petróleo
a última década reduziram seu esforc¸o tributário no Brasil. O tema é relevante devido à perspectiva de aumentos substanciais
estas receitas e às novas regras para distribuic¸ão destes recursos, definidos pela Lei 12.734/2012. Os insumos foram definidos
elas despesas de pessoal e de capital, enquanto o produto foi definido como a arrecadac¸ão tributária municipal. Com o propósito
e contornar potenciais problemas de endogeneidade devido à possível causalidade reversa de produtos nos insumos, as defasagens
as variáveis independentes foram usadas como instrumento na equac¸ão de ineficiência. O banco de dados é composto por um
ainel de municípios brasileiros observados de 2002 a 2011. Os resultados indicam que as receitas do petróleo possuem um impacto
egativo significativo nas ineficiências estimadas, sinalizando uma reduc¸ão do esforc¸o fiscal nos municípios beneficiados.
alavras-chave: Rendas do petróleo; Análise de fronteira estocástica; Esforc¸o fiscal; Municípios; Endogeneidade
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1.  Introduction
Law 9478/97, also known as “The Oil Law,” regulates the collection and sharing of oil rents between the Brazilian
federated entities. A significant portion of these rents is distributed to a subset of states and municipalities that must
fulfill some requirements, like proximity to producing areas or being affected by the activities of the oil industry.1
Despite the magnitude of oil windfalls available to those municipalities for over a decade, few studies assess the
local impacts of these rents, particularly regarding the incentives to invest them in promoting municipal development.
It is noteworthy that the Brazilian law proposes to channel oil revenues into investment and vetoes their use for payroll
and debt service. Thus, it is important to analyze whether royalties2 have generated positive changes in the realities of
the benefiting municipalities.
Different studies suggest that there is no conclusive evidence on the impact of oil royalties on eligible localities.
Depending on the chosen economic indicator, the evidence is favorable or contrary (or null) to the increase in local
welfare. Some studies find positive impact on socio-economic development and on local welfare (Navarro, 2003;
Alexandre, 2003; Gomes, 2007; Postali and Nishijima, 2013) whereas others do not observe significant differences in
the evolution of social indicators between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (Reis, 2005; Giviez and Oliveira, 2008;
Postali and Nishijima, 2011; Cac¸ador and Monte, 2013). Mixed evidence depending on the social indicator under
analysis are found in Postali and Nishijima (2008) whereas Postali (2009) concludes for negative impact of royalties
on economic growth of beneficiaries.
The guidelines for investing oil windfalls motivated some studies that found evidence of positive relationship
between these revenues and capital expenditure (Bregman, 2007), global investment (Leal and Serra, 2002) and social
spending without significant improvements in public services (Caselli and Michaels, 2013). Regarding the political
effects,3 some studies show that oil royalties give electoral advantages for incumbent mayors (Monteiro and Ferraz,
2010), because they impact positively on the likelihood of reelection (Silva et al., 2013).
Regarding fiscal impacts, some studies have sought to verify whether oil revenues impair the fiscal discipline of
the benefiting municipalities. The issue is very sensitive, as oil windfalls tend to be volatile, because they are closely
linked to prices and production of hydrocarbons. Since the benefiting localities observe a positive shift in their budget
constraints, they may be tempted to relax the incentive to collect their own taxes and/or to overspend (the flypaper
effect). Preliminary evidence with data up to 2005 suggest that municipalities covered by oil revenues do reduce fiscal
effort and overspend as consequence of royalties (Postali and Rocha, 2009; Queiroz and Postali, 2010); also, benefiting
municipalities increase the number of civil servants (Monteiro and Ferraz, 2010).
This paper aims to contribute to the fiscal branch of the aforementioned literature. It proposes to investigate further
the effect of royalties on the municipal tax effort. The methodology aims to estimate an efficient tax frontier to assess
whether oil revenues can explain the distance of the municipality from this frontier.4 The topic is relevant because
the fiscal relaxation may contribute to the progressive weakening of the local tax base, creating a vicious circle of
increasing dependence on federal and state funds.
Studies on the relationship between federation and incentives for spending and taxing gained momentum after the
Constitution of 1988 in Brazil,5 which allocated larger shares of public funds to states and municipalities, without
1 According to the Oil Law, 10% of the gross value of production of oil and natural gas should be collected by the National Treasury as royalty
revenues. Beyond royalties, there is also a “Special Tax” – a resource rent tax levied on highly productive projects. In 2012, new rules on the
distribution of royalties were approved (Law 12731/12), favoring non-producing localities at the expense of the current beneficiaries.
2 From now on, by “royalties,” we mean “royalties plus special tax.”
3 The political consequences of local expenditures in Brazil were studied by Meneguin and Bugarin (2001) and Meneguin et al. (2005), both
collecting evidence on the linkage between public spending, voting and political power. There are strong evidence that high spending increases
the likelihood of electing political allies or reelecting the incumbent mayor (Sakurai and Menezes Filho, 2008) and that the municipal budgets
exhibit opportunistic and partisan cycles (Sakurai and Menezes Filho, 2011). Also Firpo et al. (2014) link local political power to public spending,
concluding that federal deputies use amendments to reward their localities.
4 Queiroz and Postali (2010) estimate a stochastic frontier with data up to 2005 using GDP and population as inputs. However, in order to make
economic sense in a production function, inputs should be a variable under control of policymaker. The present paper meets this objective by
introducing capital and personnel expenses in the production function.
5 Countries organized as fiscal federalism aim to equalize the fiscal capacities between their regions (Dahlby and Wilson, 1994; Oates, 1999).
The evidence suggests that the separation between the power to tax and the decision to spend in the presence of grants coming from upper levels
of government under a federated system induces an increase in the size of local public budgets through distortive taxes and overspending (Winer,
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he corresponding responsibility for the supply of goods and services (Cossio, 1998). The system was designed to
educe regional income inequalities (Mendes, 2005). However, there are wide evidence that the access to federal funds
ead the Brazilian federative entities (states and municipalities) to underutilize their own tax base (Shah, 1994) and to
educe the fiscal effort (Cossio, 1998; Ribeiro and Shikida, 2000; Reis and Blanco, 1996; Ribeiro, 1998; Schwengber
nd Ribeiro, 1999; Marinho and Moreira, 1999; Veloso, 2008; Carvalho, 2008). Another distortive effect of federal
rants on the behavior of local governments is the flypaper effect,6 whose evidence for Brazil are reported by Cossio
nd Carvalho (2001), Mattos et al. (2011) and Sakurai (2013).
Although oil revenues in Brazil – royalties and special tax – are assigned following a different compensatory logic,
hey can generate the same inefficiencies arising from the usual fiscal grants. Moreover, they present a distributional pro-
le, in order to benefit the producing municipalities and/or the localities affected by activities related to the oil industry.
This paper aims to investigate this hypothesis – that oil revenues are reducing the fiscal effort of the benefiting
unicipalities – through the estimation of an efficient tax production frontier based on Battese and Coelli (1995).
e include political variables in the inefficiency equation, with the purpose of assessing whether partisan preferences
f locals help to explain inefficiency scores. As an additional contribution, we address the endogeneity of inputs by
dopting the lagged independent variable in the production function as instrument to correct the bias of reverse causality
nd/or simultaneity between inputs and outputs.
This paper is structured as follows, besides this introduction. Section 2 presents the methodology; and Section 3
rovides the data and results. The final section presents some concluding remarks.
.  Methodology
Aigner et al. (1977) originally developed the Stochastic Production Frontier method to study the technical efficiencies
f firms. The fundamental idea is to estimate a frontier that represents the potential (or optimal) production of a particular
et of productive units and observe how each one is positioned relative to this frontier. Considering i = 1, · ·  · , I  firms,
he basic model is:
yi =  f  (Xi; β) +  Vi −  Ui (1)
here Xi is the vector of inputs, yi is a measure of product, and β  is the vector of parameters to be estimated, which
escribes how production responds to changes in inputs. The production unexplained by the model (random error) is
ecomposed into two parts. The Ui component reflects the fact that the product of each unit has its upper bound on
he production frontier and possesses non-negative truncated distribution (Ui ≥  0); usually, one assumes a half-normal
istribution, such that Ui ∼  N+(μ, σ2). Vi is a random component that is assumed to be independent and identically
istributed (i.i.d.), representing shocks beyond the unit’s control, such that Vi∼N(0,  σ2V ) and Co∨(Vi,  Ui) =  0. The Vi
omponent means that the frontier itself may vary randomly between firms or over time for the same firm.
The rationale behind the stochastic frontier model can be employed to study a “tax production function.” The tax
apacity of a governmental entity can be estimated according to factors that are under its control (Ui) or beyond it (Vi).
hus, the efficiency measure can be derived from Ui, as follows7:
TEi = yi
E[yi|Ui =  0] =
yi
f  (Xi; β)
(2)Since Ui has non-negative distribution, TE  ∈  [0, 1]. Fig. 1 allows us to observe the efficiency measures. The greater
he distance Ui, the closer to zero the technical efficiency TE. This means that the municipality producing yi would be
ble to “produce” more taxes with the same amount of input Xi.8
983; Logan, 1986; Smart, 1998; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002, 2004; Goodspeed, 2002; Lucas, 2004; Aragon and Gayoso, 2005; De Mello, 2008;
anguinetti and Tommasi, 2004; Buettner, 2006; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Smart, 2007).
6 The flypaper effect is the evidence that intergovernmental grants have a greater effect on expenditures than an equivalent increase in the income
f the taxpayers of the benefiting localities. For detailed theoretical and empirical references, see Gamkhar and Shah (2006), Inman (2008), Dahlby
2011).
7 For a formal definition of technical efficiency, as well as for both the input- and the output-oriented version, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000,
. 43).
8 Similarly, one could define an input-oriented efficiency measure, that is, the amount by which the input Xi could be reduced without reducing
he observed output yi.
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Moreover, as U  →  0, TE  →  1, indicating that the unit (municipality) is close to the tax-efficient frontier. The frontier’s
position varies stochastically according to the random error V. If V  is positive, the stochastic frontier exceeds the value
of the deterministic one. This is represented by the solid curve, which does not consider the occurrence of exogenous
shocks. The opposite occurs if V  is negative. The position of the stochastic frontier as V  /=  0 is indicated by . In
Fig. 1, municipality i’s position is above the deterministic frontier, indicating that the unit experienced a positive shock.
Battese and Coelli (1995) develop a stochastic frontier model for panel data in which the inefficiency terms are
parameterized from a set of explanatory variables. Thus, yit is the production of unit i, i = 1, · ·  ·  , I, at time t, t = 1, ·  · ·  ,
T. If Xit is the (1 ×  K) vector of inputs and β is the (K  ×  1) vector of parameters to be estimated, the model can be
expressed in the following functional form:
yit =  exp(Xitβ  +  Vit −  Uit) (3)
Vit are i.i.d. random errors such that Vit∼N(0,  σ2V ). Uit are non-negative random components that possess normal
distribution truncated at zero, representing the technical production inefficiencies. They are expressed by:
Uit =  Zitδ  +  Wit (4)
Thus, Uit∼N(Zitβ,  σ2V ), where Zit are the explanatory variables of technical inefficiencies and δ  is an (M  ×  1) vector
of coefficients to be estimated. Wit ∼  N(0, σ2) is a random variable truncated at point −Zitδ.9
As regards the tax problem, there are two distinct types of variables. The impact of each input Xit on tax collection yit
depends on the magnitude of the coefficient β, which indicates whether these variables expand or contract the frontier,
i.e., whether they increase or decrease the municipal tax collection. Zit are variables that may explain the distance
between the observed tax collection and the estimated efficient frontier, while δ  are the corresponding coefficients to
be estimated. If δ  > 0, the variable contributes to distancing the municipal tax revenue from the efficient frontier, while
a negative sign implies that the variable acts to reduce inefficiency. In the case under study, the oil royalties are the
variable of interest among the set of covariates.
The model defined by Eqs. (3) and (4) can be linearized and synthesized according to the following system:
ln yit =  Xitβ +  Vit −  Uit (5)
Uit =  Zitδ  +  Wit (6)As Battese and Coelli (1995) highlight, both equations must be estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
The reason is that a two-stage procedure with ordinary least squares is inconsistent, because in the first stage, the
9 As Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 43) argue, since a panel has more information than cross-sectional data (for which the stochastic frontier
models were originally developed), it allows the relaxation of some of the strong assumptions on the distribution of the error components. In
addition, some estimation techniques in the panel do not require the assumption of independence between the error component and the independent
variables, so that the repeated cross-sections can replace it. Finally, the estimation in the panel allows consistent estimates of the coefficients as
T → ∞ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p. 96).
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nefficiency components are estimated as a regression error, i.e., under the assumption that they are white noise.
owever, the second-stage estimation involves specifying a regression model to explain such effects, violating ex post
he assumption that they are i.i.d. in the previous stage. Thus, following Battese and Coelli’s (1995) recommendation,
he equations are simultaneously estimated by maximum likelihood.10
The technical efficiency (TE) of each municipality i in year t can be defined by the ratio yit/y∗it , where y∗it is the
stimated tax revenue on the efficient frontier (Uit = 0). Therefore:
TEit = exp(Xitβ  +  Vit −  Uit)
exp(Xitβ  +  Vit) =  exp(−Uit) =  exp(−Zitδ  −  Wit) (7)
The technical efficiencies TE  measure the distance of each municipality from the efficient frontier and vary, by
esign, between zero and one. The closer to one, the more efficient the municipality and, therefore, the higher its tax
ffort. For example, if TE  = 0.75, then this municipality collects 25% less than it would obtain if the internal sources
f inefficiency were corrected.
In studies on tax efficiency, the advantage of the stochastic frontier method over classical regression is the possibility
f estimating potential revenues, taken as the upper bound for tax collection. Without this, the alternative procedure
ould be to compare the position of decision-making units with respect to the unconditional average of tax revenues,
hich is a worse reference for efficiency.
.  Data  and  results
In order to estimate the tax production function, it is necessary to select some measures of inputs that reflect the
unicipal effort in collecting taxes. This paper employs the personnel expenditures as a proxy for labor and the
apital expenditures as a proxy for capital in the tax production function. The idea is to capture the municipal effort
n managing the activities related to tax collection. Papers that employ the efficient production frontier to assess tax
ollection usually base the inputs on fiscal capacity, that is, on local economic variables (GDP, population, etc.),
ithout taking into account the effort of the government. This paper adopts a different strategy and employs another set
f inputs, following the argument that they indirectly reflect the level of effort made by municipal administrations to
ollect taxes. Given the available information, both capital and personnel expenditures are direct functions of the inputs
mployed in tax collection.11 However, due to legal restrictions, in Brazilian municipalities, the mayor observes the
scal revenue before implementing personnel and capital expenditures, which would make such variables endogenous.
oreover, some normative restrictions (like Fiscal Responsibility Act) forbid the free float of personnel and capital
xpenditures. This could introduce a bias of reverse causality in the estimates, since the estimated tax collection affects
he Municipal outlay. In order to overcome this problem, the lagged personnel and capital expenditures are used as
nstruments for personnel and capital expenditures, respectively. This allows correcting the bias of reverse causality
nd simultaneity that comes from the aforementioned restrictions, under the identification hypothesis that the past
nputs (expenditures) are uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of present output (taxes).
The measure of product is the local tax revenue. It is noteworthy that the GDP per capita was inserted into the
nefficiency equation. This variable aims to control for the fiscal capacity. Some of the aforementioned studies use it
s input for tax production, but, since the estimation is made simultaneously by maximum likelihood, the net effect of
egressing it in the inefficiency equation is equivalent, despite the difference in economic interpretation: instead of input
or tax collection, the idea is to assess whether the fiscal capacity shifts the score of efficiency relative to the frontier.
The specification of the production function is an important issue. According to Sauer et al. (2006), the functional
orm must possess certain desirable properties and the most important ones are theoretical flexibility and global
onsistency. A flexible functional form should be able to mimic arbitrarily different productive structures from an
ppropriate choice of parameters.12 On the other hand, a functional form has global consistency if it allows the
eproduction of the theoretical properties of an expected economic relationship, from the appropriate choice of
10 The expressions for the log-likelihood function as well as for the partial derivatives with respect to the parameters to be estimated can be found
n Battese and Coelli (1993).
11 The ideal would be the use of personnel expenditures and investment in activities directly linked to the management of revenues by the municipal
ower, but this level of information is not available in our database.
12 For a more detailed discussion on the role of flexibility, see Sauer et al. (2006).
400 F.A.S. Postali / EconomiA 16 (2015) 395–405
parameters. The theoretical consistency requires that the production function is: (i) monotonically non-decreasing in
inputs; (ii) single-valued for each observation; and (iii) quasi-concave, which means a convex production-possibility
set. The theoretical consistency must be the only restriction imposed on the production function, the functional form
of which should be as flexible as possible.
The two most common functional forms used for the production function are Cobb–Douglas and Translog (Coelli
et al., 2005, p. 211). Translog13 is more flexible than Cobb–Douglas, but the latter more easily meets the conditions
for global theoretical consistency, just requiring the estimated coefficients to be non-negative. For Translog, verifying
the consistency conditions is a much more complicated task.14 Our Translog estimates did not meet such criteria and,
for this reason, only the results for Cobb–Douglas are presented.
Considering the two inputs described above, the Cobb–Douglas production function can be expressed by15:
ln RTribit =  β0 +  β1 ln DespCapit +  β2 ln DespPessit +  Vit −  Uit (8)
where RTribit is the tax revenue of municipality i in year t, DespCap  is the capital expenditure and DespPess  is the
personnel expenditure. β0, β1, and β2 are the parameters to be estimated and the global consistency conditions require
that β1 ≥  0 and β2 ≥  0. The proposed inefficiency equation is given by:
Uit =  δ0 +  δ1 ln Royit +  δ2 ln PIBpcit +  δ3 ln PIBpcit−1 +  δ4 ln Popit +  δ5 ln Popit−1 +  δ6 ln TransUnit
+  δ7 ln TransUnit−1 +  δ8 ln TransEsit +  δ9 ln TransEsit−1 +  δ10Agric  +
18∑
j=11
δjDAnoit
+
25∑
j=19
δjDPartidoit +  δ26ColGo∨  +  δ27ColPres  +  Wit (9)
where Royit is the royalty revenue received by the municipality i  in year t,16 PIBpcit is the gross municipal product per
capita, POPit is the municipal population, TransUnit are financial grants from the federal government, and TransEsit are
state grants. Agricit is the share of agricultural products in the gross municipal product, the goal of which is to control
for the profile of the municipality (urban or rural). DAnoit and DPartidoit are, respectively, year dummies and dummies
representing the political party of the mayor in office. These aim to control for potential inefficiencies resulting from
partisan differences. ColGov  is a dummy equal to 1 if the major’s party belongs to the coalition that elected the state
governor and ColPres  is a dummy equal to 1 if the major’s party belongs to the coalition that elected the President
and zero otherwise. Both dummies are important to control for political alliances that may affect voluntary transfers to
municipalities. The product per capita controls for fiscal capacity, whereas grants aim to control for revenues coming
from upper governments. The population controls for the size of the municipality. In addition to the current level, the
lagged values of such variables (PIBpcit−1, Popit−1, TransUnit−1, TransEsit−1) were also included, in order to take
into account the dynamic component of inefficiency, under the rationale that past values of the economic product, the
population and the transfers may affect the current tax revenue as well as the inefficiency.
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model. Noteworthy is the great dispersion
of royalty revenues, a result of the large asymmetry in the distribution of these resources that prevails in the Brazilian
federation.
13 A functional form is flexible of k-order if it allows the building of an approximate function of which the number of parameters sufficient for its
value at a given point is equal to the arbitrary function until the kth derivative. Cobb–Douglas is flexible of first order, whereas Translog is flexible
of second order. As evidenced by Coelli et al. (2005), the higher the degree of flexibility, the better, but it can generate estimation problems, such
as collinearity and the curse of dimensionality.
14 See Sauer et al. (2006, pp. 147–148).
15 The general functional form of Cobb–Douglas is yit = ecp
[
β0
n∏
i=1
xβiit
]
, the linearized version of which is given by (5).
16 As there are many observations with a zero value, we actually calculated In(1 + Roy) ≈ In(Roy). The orders of magnitude of this variable allow
such approximation.
F.A.S. Postali / EconomiA 16 (2015) 395–405 401
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean St. deviation Min. Max.
Tax Revenue (RTrib) 8401.91 155,650.97 0.00 15,021,430.78
Capital Expenditure (DespCap) 5045.03 32,747.56 1270.10 2,565,202.95
Personnel Expenditure (DespPess) 17,993.02 127,128.87 709.42 8,136,915.46
Oil Royalties (Roy) 561.26 10,931.36 0.00 1,230,973.11
Municipal Product per Capita (PIBpc) 10.57 309.85 0.72 50.67
Population (Pop) 34,332.31 204,151.58 0.00 11,316,119.00
Grants from Federal Govt. (TransUn) 13,047.81 43,139.75 0.00 1,725,472.90
Grants from State (TransEs) 11,089.74 90,985.02 0.00 7,748,201.47
Share of Agricultural Product (%) (Agric) 19.34 16.55 0.00 84.82
#Obs. 46,153
#Municipalities 5559
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The results are exhibited in Table 2. The conditions for theoretical consistency of the Cobb–Douglas production
unction are satisfied because the coefficients of both inputs17 are positive and statistically significant. This means
hat both expenses contribute to generating tax revenues for municipalities.With regard to the explanation for the
nefficiencies (9), oil revenues have a negative impact on tax effort, very small though. Nevertheless, this impact is
tatistically significant at 1%. GDP per capita and population both have significant negative coefficients, indicating
hat the fiscal capacity and the size of the municipality contribute to increasing the efficiency in collecting tax, which is
n intuitive result: collecting tax is easier for large, rich municipalities than for poor, small ones. The same conclusion
an be noted for the lagged values of these variables.
Grants from upper levels of government (state and federal) exhibit a curious result: whereas the current grants
ncrease efficiency, their lagged values contribute to reduce it. This result illustrates the dynamic profile of grant-
ependency. Municipalities benefiting from high financial transfers in the previous year do relax their fiscal effort in
he following year.
Rural municipalities are less efficient than urban ones, since the variable representing the share of agricultural
roducts in the gross municipal product is significantly positive. Rural municipalities are more dependent on federal
nd state funds. Since they have low tax base, they face greater difficulty to collect ISS and IPTU, the two most
epresentative municipal tax.
The year dummies are negatively significant between 2005 and 2007, but positively significant from 2009 and 2011.
his can be interpreted as a temporal decrease in inefficiency relative to 2003, representing a kind of learning curve
or municipalities until 2007. After that, municipalities may have suffered setbacks as a result of the global crisis, but
his hypothesis deserves better investigation.18 Dummies for the most representative political parties of the Brazilian
ystem were inserted, relative to others. As can be seen, municipalities with mayors belonging to PSDB and DEM tend
o be more efficient in tax collection than other associations.
Finally, political alliances with state and federal government impact positively on efficiency, since dummies rep-
esenting political alignment of the major in office are negatively significant. This means that coalitions improve the
fficiency in tax collection.
The fit of the model to the stochastic frontier follows the parameterization proposed by Battese and Corra (1977)
uch that γ  =  σ2/(σ2 +  σ2V ), where σ2 is the variance of the inefficiency component U  and σ2V is the variance of the
andom error V. Thus, γ ∈  [0, 1], indicating the adequacy of a stochastic frontier model vis-à-vis the usual econometric
odel. If γ →  1, the variance of the inefficiency is significant, indicating that the frontier model is appropriate; if γ  is
ot statistically different from zero, the variance of U  is small compared with the total variance, so that a frontier brings
17 In a previous stage, both expenditures were regressed on their lagged values, used as instruments. The actual inputs in the production function
re predicted values of these regressions.
18 After 2008, municipalities have experimented lower constitutional grants, as consequence of tax exemptions (mainly IPI) and called for changes
n the percent of these transfers.
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Table 2
Cobb–Douglas tax production function. Dependent variable: municipal tax revenues. Independent
variables in log.
Coefficient Standard deviation
X
Constant (β0) 10.223*** 0.167
DespCap (β1) 0.217*** 0.009
DespPess (β2) 0.249*** 0.009
Z
Constant (δ0) 14.882*** 0.094
Roy (δ1) 1.87E−09*** 2.22E−10
PIBpc (δ2) −0.383*** 0.023
PIBpc(−1) (δ3) −0.188*** 0.023
Pop (δ4) −0.423*** 0.018
Pop(−1) (δ5) −0.116*** 0.018
TransUn (δ6) −0.361*** 0.004
Trans Un(−1) (δ7) 0.253*** 0.004
Trans Es (δ8) −0.270*** 0.004
Trans Es(−1) (δ9) 0.047*** 0.003
AGRIC (δ10) 0.774*** 0.027
Dummy 2004 (δ11) −0.017 0.012
Dummy 2005 (δ12) −0.089*** 0.015
Dummy 2006 (δ13) −0.210*** 0.014
Dummy 2007 (δ14) −0.198*** 0.014
Dummy 2008 (δ15) −0.014 0.021
Dummy 2009 (δ16) 0.154*** 0.014
Dummy 2010 (δ17) 0.219*** 0.015
Dummy 2011 (δ18) 0.301*** 0.016
Dummy PMDB (δ19) 0.103*** 0.031
Dummy PT (δ20) 0.109*** 0.028
Dummy PSDB (δ21) −0.043*** 0.010
Dummy PDT (δ22) −0.017 0.013
Dummy PTB (δ23) 0.005 0.012
Dummy DEM (δ24) −0.050*** 0.014
Dummy PL (δ25) −0.011 0.018
ColGo∨(δ26) −0.018*** 0.008
ColPres(δ27) −0.090*** 0.030
σ2 0.411*** 0.003
γ 0.007*** 0.001
Log-likelihood −30,317.22
λ test of the one-sided error 42,230.46**
*** 1% significant.
** 5% significant.
no gains compared with a classical regression model. As can be seen in the results, although γ  is low, it is statistically
different from zero, which confirms the suitability of the frontier.
Another confirming test of the adequacy of stochastic frontier is the likelihood ratio statistic λ, which tests the
joint null hypothesis H0 : γ  = δ1 = · ·  ·  = δ27 = 0). It is significant at the 5% level, considering the critical values found
by Kodde and Palm (1986, p. 1246),19 which means that the one-sided error assumption for Uit is valid (Eq. (4)).Table 3 reports the estimated technical efficiency of the top 20 beneficiaries of oil revenues, in gross values,
considering the average for 2002–2011. They are ranked by oil revenues. The scores of some big beneficiaries are
well above the national average (0.05), which is very low. Campos dos Goytacazes, the most benefiting from royalties,
19 This statistic has a mixed χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom given by the number of restrictions imposed on the model (in this case 28).
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Table 3
Estimated technical efficiency of the top 20 beneficiaries. Average 2002–2011. Royalties in R$ millions.
State Municipality Royalties TE
RJ Campos dos Goytacazes 920.65 0.54
RJ Macaé 379.80 0.52
RJ Rio das Ostras 267.21 0.36
RJ Cabo Frio 157.12 0.46
RJ Quissamã 93.20 0.31
RJ São João da Barra 89.66 0.18
RJ Casimiro de Abreu 64.48 0.19
ES Presidente Kennedy 58.47 0.10
RJ Rio de Janeiro 51.86 1.00
AM Coari 51.14 0.20
RJ Armac¸ão dos Búzios 49.85 0.16
RJ Angra dos Reis 49.65 0.62
SP São Sebastião 48.02 0.45
ES Linhares 41.10 0.30
RJ Niterói 39.84 0.85
RJ Duque de Caxias 30.00 0.89
RJ Carapebus 29.34 0.08
RJ Parati 29.18 0.09
RJ Magé 25.49 0.21
RN Mossoró 25.00 0.37
Average Brazil 0.05
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mource: Estimated by the author.
xhibit technical efficiency of 0.54 whereas Rio de Janeiro is on the efficient frontier (score = 1.00). The table allows
oncluding that the benefiting municipalities are more efficient than the national average, but oil revenues impact
egatively on such scores.
.  Concluding  remarks
This study aimed to investigate the hypothesis that Brazilian oil windfalls may be leading the benefiting
unicipalities to relax their fiscal effort. To fulfill this goal, we estimated a Cobb–Douglas stochastic production
rontier, the regularity conditions of which are more easily met. We used the model of Battese and Coelli (1995),
hich allows the joint estimation of the production function and the inefficiencies, parameterized in explanatory
ariables, among which are the oil revenues. To overcome possible bias of reverse causality of inputs and out-
uts, we adopted the lagged independent variable as instruments; also, the inefficiency equation employs lagged
conomic product, population and grants with the purpose of controlling for the dynamic components of tax
ollection.
The results show that oil royalties reduced the tax effort of the benefiting municipalities, to the extent that there is
 negative and statistically significant relationship between these revenues and the estimated inefficiencies.
Such results suggest that the current discussion on more equitable distribution of royalties between the Brazil-
an states and municipalities should be conducted with caution, since a considerable portion of Brazilian localities
uffer from low fiscal capacity, due to regional inequalities. The increase in oil revenues may contribute to reduc-
ng the incentive to collect taxes, generating a vicious circle of dependence on federal funds, which is a chronic
roblem in Brazil. This problem is particularly relevant in the context of pre-salt, due to the expected boost in such
evenues.
Of course, this study has limitations and several extensions are possible. In particular, other production functions
an be estimated, including further control variables. The effects on expenditures can also be studied. Nevertheless, we
elieve we have taken an important step in understanding the impact of oil revenues on local realities and in designing
echanisms for the effective use of these rents in the coming years.
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